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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

METROPOLITAN INVESTMENT
COMPANY, a Partnership composed
of W. ADRIAN WRIGHT, W.
MEEKS WIRTHLIN, and A. P.
NEILSON,
Plaintiff-RespondentJ

1

Case No.
9622

vs.
JERRY SINE and DORA T. SINE,
his wife,
Defendants- A. E.Pellants.

BRIEF OF

APPELL~TS

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action initiated by respondent, a partner~
ship, to quiet title to real estate originally conveyed by
appellants to Albert P. Neilson, a partner, subject to
the provision as contained in the instruments of conveyance which were recorded that the subject property
should not be used for the erection of a motel thereon.
1
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DISPOSITION OF LOWER CQURT
The case was tried to the Court. From a judgment
by the District Court for plaintiff defendants appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment and
judgment in their favor as a matter of law.

STATEMENT

o:F

FACTS

The Metropolitan Investment Company, respondent herein, is a partnership composed of W. Adrian
Wright, ,V. Meeks Wirthlin and A. P. Neilson. (Complaint, para. 1; R. 19 ).
On October 26, 1956, A. P. Neilson signed an
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase Property from appellants situated at 324 West North
Temple Street, Salt Lake City, for a price of $16,500
with the written stipulation that "This property shall
not be used for the erection of a motel thereon" (Exhibit 6) . Upon this property stood an apartment house
having a front size of approximately 40 feet and a depth
of 90 feet, consisting of eight rental units (R. 106).
On October 30, 1956, Jerry and Dora Sine executed
an 'Assignment of Uniform Real Estate Contract,
whereby they assigned and set over to A. P. Neilson
all their interest in the subject property in consideration
of cash and of the covenant by A. P. Neilson that the
2
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subject property "shall not be used for the erection
of a motel thereon" (Exhibit 7) . Jerry Sine and his
wife also executed a Quit-Claim Deed dated October
29, 1956, to A. P. Neilson covering the subject property
with the stipulation that "This property shall not be
used for the erection of a motel thereon" (Exhibit 1).
By Quit-Claim deed executed on November 5, 1956,
A. P. Neilson and his wife conveyed to W. Adrian
\Vright and his wife, as joint tenants, an undivided
one-third interest in the subject real estate, and to W.
Meeks Wirthlin and his wife, as joint tenants, an undivided one-third interest in said property (Exhibit 2) .
Finally on November 21, 1956, the said three partners
and their wives conveyed said property to Metropolitan
Investment Company, the respondent herein (Exhibit
4) . The Quit-Claim Deed signed by the Sines was
recorded in the Office of the County Recorder of Salt
Lake County, Utah, October 30, 1956 (Exhibit 1).
Jerry and Dora Sine were in October, 1956, conducting a motel business as a partnership. The partners
opened and operated Se Rancho Motor Lodge, a large
motel at 640 West North Temple, and Scotty's Romney
Motel situated on North Temple between Sixth and
Seventh West. Se Rancho and Scotty's Romney are
both situated on the north side of North Temple Street.
Se Rench is about three and one half blocks west of
the subject property (R. 63, 65, 67, 100) and Scotty's
Romney is one block further west ( R. 67) .
Mr. Jerry Sine was cognizant of the fact that A. P.
3
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Neilson was interested in motel properties, and he was
not willing to sell the subject property to anyone who
intended to use it in conjunction with other properties
to construct a large motel. His motive for preventing
a motel from being constructed on the subject property
was to protect his motel business conducted as SeRancho
and Scotty's Romney. Mr. and Mrs. Sine advertised
by numerous road signs which, in part, attract guests
originating from regions outside of Salt Lake Valley.
If a large motel was erected, in part, on the subject
property, appellants feared that .the business of Se
Rancho and Scotty's Romney would be adversely affected. Guests, especially those traveling from the
north and south and turning onto North Temple Street,
would be diverted into such motel, to the detriment of
Se Rancho and Scotty's Romney situated to the west
thereof (R. 5, 52, 68, 79, 90, 99, 100).
Jerry and Dora Sine would not have transferred
the subject property to A. P. Neilson for the cash consideration received without the incorporation in the
agreement of the covenant running to him and his
assignees against the use of the property as a motel
(R. 67).
Metropolitan Investment Company, the respondent, on September 30, 1960, agreed to sell the subject
property to Western Travel, Inc. This company lias
planned to build a motor hotel on the subject proeprty,
and adjacent and surrounding properties. This corporation desires that the covenant against construction
4
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of a motel on the subject property be avoided. The
three partners of lVIetropolitan Investment Company
own large blocks of stock in Western Travel, Inc. (R.
47' 58, 49, 80, 82, 83, 84).

POINTS URGED FOR REVERSAL
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE OF RECORD DOES NOT
SUPPORT THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING (NO. 18) THAT SINCE OCTOBER, 1956,
THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT AND SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD AND AREA SU,RROUNDING THE
"SUBJECT PROPERTY."
POINT II
THE FINDINGS OF THE DISTRICT
COURT (NO. 14, NO. 22) THAT THE RESTRICTION WAS LIMITED TO CONSTRUCTION BY A. P. NEILSON PERSONALLY IS
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE OF
RECORD.
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION
TH.._-\ T ~IR. AND MRS. SINE, THE APPELLANTS HEREIN, AND ALL WHO MAY
5
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CLAIM UNDER THEM, HAVE NO RIGHTS
WHATSOEVER IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE APPLICABLE LAW.
(a) A legally enforcible promise may be made

that the promisor will not engage in a business in competition with a business to be
carried on upon land of the beneficiary of
the promise.
(b) The promise of A. P. Nielson is binding
upon Metropolitan Investment CompanyJ
the appellantJ which took title to the prop·
erty with full knowledge that the promise
had been made.
(c) The promise is enforcible even thought it
is indefinite as to the duration of the obligation created.
(d) Change of neighborhood of the subject
property has not occurred to the extent that
the enforcibility of the covenant is affected.
(e) The promise does not tend toward producing a monopoly of trade or business in the
· area which includes the restricted land.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE OF RECORD DOES NOT
SUPPORT THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING (NO. 18) THAT SINCE OCTOBER, 1956,
THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT AND SUBSTANTIAL CH.A.NGE IN THE NEIGHBOR6
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HOOD AND AREA SURROUNDING THE
"SUBJECT PROPERTY."
The evidence on the other hand establishes that on
and prior to October, 1956, motel properties were being
operated and others planned for the area. Respondent's
witness Meeks VVirthlin testified that several motel
properties were prior to October, 1956, operated in the
general area, such as City Center, Sea Gull, Mission,
and Bob's. Mr. Sine testified that prior to October,
1956, the newspapers of Salt Lake City published
reports of the planned construction of a large motel
by Utah Motor Lodge in the near area (Exhibit 13-P) ,
and that he and many others were cognizant of plans
which had been drawn to construct another large motel
in the general area to be known as City Center Motel
(Exhibit 9- P) . The character of the neighborhood
was set by 1956, and the subsequent changes followed
the set pattern ( R. 34, 102, 107) .

POINT II
THE FINDINGS O:F THE DISTRICT
COURT (NO. 14, NO. 22) THAT THE RESTRICTION WAS LIMITED TO CONSTRUCTION BY A. P. NEILSON PERSONALLY IS
XOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE OF
RECORD.
The reading of the covenant as contained in the
instruments of conveyance proves that Mr. and Mrs.
7
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Sine sought protection against acts of A. P. Neilson
and his assignees. ~Ir. Wirthlin testified that it was not
the intent that the property could be purchased and
sold free of the covenant to third person ( R. 29) . A
covenant by A. P. Neilson personally which could have
been circumvented by mere transfer of title would have
been entirely worthless. Mr. Sine did not want the
property developed as a motel by Mr. Neilson nor
those taking title from him with knowledge of the restriction (Exhibits I & 7, R. 28-29, 44, 59) .
It is unquestionably true that Mr. Neilson intended
to transfer the property to the partnership at the time
he purchased it.
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION
THAT MR ...AND MRS. SINE, THE APPELLANTS HEREIN, AND ALL WHO MAY
CLAIM UNDER THEM, HAVE NO RIGHTS
WHATSOEVER IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE APPLICABLE LAW.
(a) A legally enforcible promise may be made

that the promisor will not engage in a business in competition with a business to be
carried on upon land of the beneficiary of
the promise.
In the instant case, A. P. Neilson acquired the
subject property from the Sines for a consideration in
8
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cash plus a promise that the acquired property would
not be used for the erection of a motel. The motive of
the Sines in exacting this promise was to shield their
motel business carried on upon property located on
the same street as the subject property from competition.
Oliver vs. Hewitt (Supreme Court of Appeals of
Va., 1950) 191 Va. 163, 60 S.E. 2d 1, involved the
owner of a grocery store who conveyed two lots a short
distance from his store by a deed which contained a
provision that neither the grantees nor their assigns
should sell groceries or bottled soft drinks in any
building to be erected on the lots. The original grantees,
after the dede was recorded, transferred the property
to another who leased it to a person who commenced
selling groceries and soft drinks on the property. The
Court held that the sale of groceries and soft drinks
should be enjoined so long as the promisee conducted
his store for the sale of drinks and soft drinks.
In Whitney vs. Union Railway Company, 11
Gray 359, 71 American Decisions 715, the Court held
that an owner of real property has the right so to deal
with it as to restrain its use by his grantees within such
limits as to prevent its appropriation to purposes which
would impair the value of diminish the pleasure or enjoyment of land which the grantor retains.
In Restatement of Property by American Law
Institute, Vol. 5, the following statement is found:
9
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" * * Thus a promise may be made that the
promisor will not personally engage in a business
in competition with the business intended to be
carried on upon the land of the beneficiary of
the promise." (Page 3152).
(b) The prornise of A. P. Nielson is binding
upon Metropolitan Investment Company~
the appellant~ which took title to the property with full knowledge that the promise
had been made.

Mr. A. P. Neilson, as a partner, owned a one-third
interest in Metropolitan Investment Company. Mr.
Neilson acquired the property with the intent of conveying it to the partnership and the conveyances to the
partners occurred soon after Neilson's acquisition.
Without question all of the partners were cognizant
of the covenant in question. Mr. Wirthlin testified that
Neilson acted for the partnership in making the purchase (R. 38-39, 46).
The promise respecting the use of the subject
property was not intended to be purely personal with
A. P. Neilson. Mr. Sine incorporated in both the
Earnest Mo:r;:tey Receipt and Offer to Purchase and the
Quit-Claim Deed the statement precluding the construction of a motel on the subject property. Mr.
Stanger was acting for all of the partners (R. 38-40).
It was Mr. Sine's presumed purpose that recorded
instruments should give notice to grantees of the restrictive covenant ( R. 60) .
In the Restatement of the Law of Property by
10
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./unerican Law Institute, Vol. 5, the following comnlents are found:
" * * Thus the failure to use the word 'assigns'
in the making of the promise to erect and maintain a fence where none was in existence at the
time of making the promise does not necessarily
prevent the drawing of an inference that the
promise was intended to bind the successors of
the promisor. * * *
" ***The probability that a promise respecting the use. of land is intended to bind the successors of the promisor is enhanced by the permanency of the situation apparently sought to
be produced by the performance of the promise.
The more permanent the situation intended to
be produced, the more likely that succesors of
the promisor were intended to be bound by his
promise since the control of the land by the
promisor himself may be but temporary." (Pages
3197-3198).

In this case, the sole control of the property by
l\Ir. Neilson was indeed but temporary.
In Hayes et al. vs. Gibbs (1956) 110 U. 54, 169

P. 2d 781, it was held that one was chargeable with
notice of restrictive covenants in deeds in his chain of
title.
The Court in Oliver vs. Hewitt, supra, held that
regardless of whether a covenant not to use land for
a certain purpose runs with the land, a court of equity
will, nevertheless, enforce it against a grantee taking
through a deed reciting the covenant and subject there11
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to, or against a grantee taking title with full knowledge
of its existence.

(c) The promise is enforcible even thought it
is indefinite as to the duration of the obligation created.
The fact that the promise respecting the use of
the subject land was indefinite with reference to its
intended duration calls for an ascertainment of the
intention of the parties. This may be found from purpose
intended to be accomplished. Mr. Sine sought to shield
from competition. The duration of the covenant might
be limited to the period of time during which he operates
Se Rancho and Romney Motels.
The cases are not in accord as to the duration of
covenants where its duration is not specified.
One view is that such covenants are presumed to
continue for the duration of the estate created, and
another is that such covenants will be limited to a
reasonable time. The latter view appears preferable.
(Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions-14 American Jurisprudence, Section 205, Page 615. See annotation 95 ALR 458.)
(d) Change of neighborhood of the subject

property has not occurred to the extent that
the enforcibility of the covenant is affected.
The neighborhood when the promise was made was
fast running commercial, and it was predictable from
facts then known that many properties would be de12
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veloped as motels. The need of protection from competition by other motels was then apparent.
The fact that the trend toward motel construction
has accelerated does not constitute such a change of
neighborhood as to nullify the promise here questioned.
In 1-Iumphrey's et. al. vs. Ibach (1932) 110 N.J.
Eq. 647, 160 AtL 531, the Court held that a change in
neighborhood to afford relief must be so great as clearly
to neutralize the benefits of the restriction to a point
of defeating the object and purpose of the restrictive
promise. See annotation 85 ALR 985.
The increase of motel properties in the neighborhood made the promise here given of more value to
Mr. and Mrs. Sine and did not defeat its object.
(e) The promise does not tend toward produc-

ing a monopoly of trade or business in the
area which includes the restricted land.
The mere fact that a promise restricts the use of
land is not enough to render the promise illegal. In this
case the restriction on use of the land cannot be held
to create a monopoly. The evidence of record clearly
indicates that the motel business is increasing in the
neighborhood, even though the subject property has
~ot been so developed.
The question here posed is treated in Restatement
of Law of Contracts by American Law Institute, Vol. 2
as follows:

13
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"A buyer may make a reasonable contract
restricting himself from using the property which
he bought in a way that would compete with or
harm the seller. The only limits imposed by the
law on the owner of property restricting his
power to exact contracts from a purchaser to
refrain from using the property in a certain way
are those imposed by public policy, and though
public policy forbids unreasonable restraint of
trade, and therefore forbids attempting to control prices on resale by a system of agreements,
it does not forbid contracts which reasonably
protect a business of either the buyer or the seller
without tending to affect the public harmfully
by monopoly or enhancement of prices.
"Illustration . . . .
"A sells Blackacre to B who promises as part
of the transaction not to use it for mercantile
purposes in competition with A. The promise is
not illegal." (Para. 516, Page 998).
The promise here involved could not possibly limit
competition or control prices to a point of monopoly.
In fact it was admitted by a witness for respondent
that the property immediately adjoining the subject
property could be used even though the subject property was omitted. This witness, however, expressed
the opinion that the incorporation of the property in
the motel project would be desirable from an architectural point of view.

SUMMARY .AND CONCLUSION
This is a case where a person purchased land for
use for motel purposes in connection with other motels
14
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in the vicinity which he and his wife owned (R. 63, 67).
A. P. Neilson had a real estate agent approach the
appellant; and in order to induce the appellants to sell
the property, promised that it would not be used for
motel purposes ( R. 66-67) . Except for these representations and the restrictions in the deed and contract,
appellants would not have made the sale (R. 66). Now
the partnership for whom the land was originally purchased asks the Court to free it of the restriction as an
unenforceable covenant. Such should not be the ruling
if it can be avoided.
This brief shows the law to be that such covenants
are enforceable, at least by the person who was the
original covenantee. There is no question of a bona fide
purchaser in this case, which might free the land of the
restriction, and the evidence is that the purpose of Mr.
Sine was consistent with his ownership of property at
that time and the development of the neighborhood
has been exactly along the line of the contemplated
use, namely, for motel purposes. Appellant should have
the benefit of the contract which the plaintiffs through
its agent offered to the appellants when the contract
of sale was entered into. Enforcement of the covenant
would not be contrary to any public policy, and the
judgment of the District Court should be reversed, and
the restrictive covenant upheld.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS, BIRD AND HART
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants
15
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